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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue1
How far should the requirement of judicial impartiality and independence extend?
Should International Criminal Court (“ICC”) Officers and Staff comply with the same
standards of judicial independence as Judges and other court officers?
B. Summary of Conclusions
i. The Pre-Trial Chamber is obligated to recuse itself or separate
Mr. Gilbert Bitti , Senior Legal Advisor to the Pre-Trial
Chamber, from working on any case that he previously
handled as a Legal Advisor in the Office of the Prosecutor.
Article 41 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court gives the
Presidency the power to remove a judge when:
“[H]is or her impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground. A
judge shall be disqualified from a case in accordance with this paragraph
if, inter alia, that judge has previously been involved in any capacity in
that case before the Court or in a related criminal case at the national level
involving the person being investigated or prosecuted.”2
If Mr. Bitti continues to work on the same case for the Pre-Trial Chamber on which he
advised the Office of the Prosecutor while working there, then it raises the objective
appearance of bias. In other cases where a Judge’s impartiality has been challenged, the
Judge has taken affirmative steps, such as not assuming executive duties, to assure the
tribunal that there was no threat to its impartiality. In those cases where the Judge has not
taken affirmative actions, the Appeals Chamber declined to question the Trial Court’s
1

How far should the requirement of judicial impartiality extend? Should International
Criminal Court Officers and Staff comply with the same standards of judicial
independence and impartiality as Judges and other court officers?
2

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 41, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter
Rome Statute]. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1].
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discretion if issues of partiality were well known to all parties and anyone could have
raised the issue at a lower level. Because the Pre-Trial Chamber has not taken any steps
to reassure the parties that information Mr. Bitti gained while working for the Office of
the Prosecutor will not taint the judges he serves, then the Judges must either recuse
themselves or present evidence that they have separated Mr. Bitti from such cases.
ii. If the Judges do not recuse themselves, then the act of
hiring Mr. Gilbert Bitti is an administrative decision
which adversely impacts the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
objective impartiality and judicial independence.
Although the Court in Prosecutor v. Delalic3 refused to dismiss the Appeals Panel
solely because members participated in an administrative decision regarding Judge Odio
Benito’s impartiality, in dicta the Court noted that if an administrative decision impinges
on impartiality then it could serve as a basis for disqualification.4 Here, the Pre-Trial
Chamber made an administrative decision when it hired Mr. Bitti that could negatively
reflect on their independence and impartiality because they knew or should have known
the consequences. Mr. Bitti previously worked for the Officer of the Prosecutor and his
duties for the Pre-Trial Chamber, if not properly monitored, would overlap with and
conflict with his past duties.
Given that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s administrative hiring decision is so closely
linked with concepts of objective bias, the Pre-Trial Chamber should note that this
“administrative” decision raises questions of the appearance of bias.

3

Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision of the Bureau on Motion to Disqualify Judges
Pursuant to Rule 15 or in the Alternative that Certain Judges Recuse Themselves, (October 25, 1999).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 7].

4

Id. at ¶ 9 - 10.

-8-

iii. The ICC Statute and tradition both give the Office of
the Prosecutor wide discretion, but statutory
deficiencies allow political interference.
Article 42 of the Rome Statute gives the Prosecutor independence from political
orders, but other provisions in the Rome Statute enable political decisions to override the
Prosecutor’s independence.5 Thus while our ideals hope the in the sensitive area of
international criminal prosecutors would be free from political interference reality
cautions otherwise.
II. BACKROUND
A. Factual Backround

5

See Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 42 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1]. See Also Id.
at art. 16. (Noting that the Security council may defer a prosecutor’s investigation under its Chapter VII
powers of the United Nations Charter for up to 12 months). See also Id. at art. 15 (noting that the
Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu). See Also Id. at art. 14 (Regards State Party referral
for the Office of the Prosecutor to start an investigation). See Also Id. at art. 12-13. (Regards the
jurisdiction of the court to hear a case.) See Also Id. at art. 19 (If a State sufficiently investigates or
prosecutes a case then the court lacks jurisdiction). See Also William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the
International Criminal Court 82 (2nd Ed. 2004) (“The International Law Commission proposal met with
sharp criticism as an interference in the independence and impartiality of the future court. By allowing
political considerations to influence prosecution many felt that the entire process could be discredited.”)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 18]. See Also Id. at 119 (“The initiative to prosecute a case
may come from three sources: a State Party, the Security Council or the Prosecutor,” internal citations
omitted). See Also Id. at 120 (“Some powerful States vigourously opposed the idea [of a fully independent
prosecutor], fearful that the position might be occupied by an NGO-friendly litigator with an attitude…
During the Rome Conference, the United States declared that an independent prosecutor “not only offers
little by way of advancing the mandate of the Court and the principles of prosecutorial independence and
effectiveness, but also will make much more difficult the Prosecutor’s central task of thoroughly and fairly
investigating the most egregious of crimes… The fears of the conservatives have been given some
recognition in provisions by which the Court’s judges may supervise prosecutorial discretion.” Emphasis
added).
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The Office of the Prosecutor is one of the four “organs” of the International
Criminal Court along with the Divisions, the Presidency and the Registry.6 The
Divisions “organ” contains the Pre-Trial, Trial, and Appellate Divisions.7 The State
Parties elect the Tribunal’s 18 judges for a single 9 year term and the judges are ineligible
for re-election.8 Three judges, elected by a majority of the Tribunal’s 18 judges,
comprise the ICC Presidency to administer the court.9 The Registry handles the nonjudicial aspects of the Court’s administration and the principle officer, the Registrar is
elected to a five year term by the judges.10
The Office of the Prosecutor, a “separate and independent organ of the court,”
investigates and prosecutes suspected crimes and criminals.11 The State Parties elected
the Prosecutor and he and his deputies must be “persons of high moral character with
extensive experience in criminal prosecutions.”12 All principles of the Court’s “organs,”
judges, the Prosecutor and his deputies, and the Registrar and his deputies take a solemn
oath to carry out their duties “impartially and conscientiously.”13

6

William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 177 (2nd Ed. 2004) [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at tab 18]; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 34 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 1].

7

Id.

8

Id. at 177, 179; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 36 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1]

9

Id. at 177; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 38 (noting that the Presidency is responsible for the “proper
administration of the Court, with exception of the Office of the Prosecutor.”) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 1].
10

Id. at 182-183; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art 43 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1].

11

Id. at 181-182; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art 42 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1].

12

Id.

13

Id. at 183; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art 45 [ reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1].

- 10 -

On December 7, 2005 a former Legal Advisor in the Office of the Prosecutor
(“OTP”), Mr. Gilbert Bitti, surprised the OTP when he attended a Pre-Trial conference as
a Senior Legal Advisor to the Pre-Trial Division.14 Previously Mr. Bitti worked in the
OTP as a Legal Advisor in the Legal Advisory Section of the OTP from January 2004
until October 2005.15 Immediately after leaving the OTP he became Senior Legal
Advisor to the Pre-Trial Division in October 2005.16
Mr. Bitti’s duties in the OTP included rendering legal advice, participating in
legal discussions regarding pending cases, and composing legal memoranda advising the
Prosecutor.17 Most troubling, Mr. Bitti worked on the same case in the OTP for which he
attended the Pre-Trial conference as the Senior Legal Advisor for the Pre-Trial
Division.18 Previously, Mr. Bitti wrote legal memoranda, participated in discussion and
helped to develop legal strategies for crimes that occurred in Uganda and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.19 As Senior Legal Advisor to the Pre-Trial Division it’s likely
that Mr. Bitti will work on issues that he previously worked on and helped devise strategy
for in the OTP.20

14

Prosecutor v. Kony, Prosecutor’s Application to Separate the Senior Legal Advisor to the Pre-Trial
Division from Rendering Legal Advice Regarding the Case, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, ¶ 10 (August 31,
2006) [Hereinafter referred to as “Prosecutor’s Application”] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
tab 10].

15

Id. at 4.

16

Id.

17

Id. at 4-5.

18

Id.

19

Id. at 7-8.

20

Id. at 9.

- 11 -

When the OTP learned of Mr. Bitti’s new position as Senior Legal Advisor to the
Pre-Trial Division, it took steps to notify the court of this appearance of impropriety.
Indeed, in its application before the Pre-Trial Chamber II the OTP noted
“On 9 January 2006, approximately one month after the OTP
learned that Mr. Bitti appeared to be participating in the same case
in which he had worked as OTP Legal Adviser, the OTP filed a
notice in this proceeding and in the DRC [Democratic Republic of
the Congo] proceeding informing the Pre-Trial Chambers that the
OTP had sought certain administrative relief from the Presidency,
with the aim of preventing future challenges by any party to the
appearance of impartiality of the judges of the Pre-Trial
Chamber.”21
Between January and October 2006 the OTP repeatedly voiced its concerns to the PreTrial Chambers, but the Court did not take affirmative steps to assure the Prosecutor that
Mr. Bitti’s duties would not include the Kony case that he worked on while at the OTP.22
Since this January 2006, defense counsel has also joined the Prosecution’s
request, since the Court has issued conflicting statements regarding Mr. Bitti’s duties.23
B. Historical Backround
Nuremberg provides a basis for international criminal tribunals and the
appearance of impartiality problem. Several drafters of the London Agreement and the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which created the Nuremberg Tribunal,
later participated in the trials.24 The London Agreement and the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal gave the Nuremberg Tribunal power to prosecute Nazi

21

Id. at 10 (internal citations omitted, clarification added), See also id. at note 14.

22

Id. at 14.

23

Id.

24

Whitney Harris, Tyranny on Trial: The Trial of the Major German War Criminals at the End of World
War II at Nuremberg, Germany, 1945-1946 498-499 (1954).
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war criminals. Justice Robert Jackson was the United States chief representative, helping
to form the London Agreement.25 Justice Jackson later served as the Chief American
Prosecutor at Nuremberg.26 Advocates for the United Kingdom and France, who helped
their nations’ negotiate the London Agreement, also served as their nations’ prosecutors
at Nuremberg.27 Most troubling were situations where the Tribunal’s judges previously
advocated for a seemingly partial decision.
Before trial at Nuremberg Soviet General Iona Timofeevich Nikitchenko
remarked:
We are dealing here with the chief war criminals who have already
been convicted and whose conviction has been already announced by both
the Moscow and Crimea declarations by the heads of the governments,
and those declarations both declare to carry out immediately just
punishment for the offenses which have been committed… The case for
the prosecution is undoubtedly known to the judge before the trial starts
and there is, therefore, no necessity to create a sort of fiction that the judge
is a disinterested person who has no legal knowledge of what has
happened before. If such procedure is adopted that the judge is supposed
to be impartial, it would only lead to unnecessary delays and offer the
opportunity for the accused to bring delays in the action of the trial.28
General Nikitchenko represented the USSR at Nuremberg and the principle
French negotiator, M. Le Conseiller R. Falco, served as France’s alternate member on the
Tribunal.29
Critics charge that the Nuremberg Tribunal was nothing more than “victors’
justice” and that the Tribunal was not impartial, especially given General Nikitchenko’s
25

Id. at 499.

26

Id

.
27

Id.

28

General Nikitchenko quoted in Id. at pg 16-17.

29

Id. at 499.

- 13 -

seemingly biased statement.30 Furthermore since Nuremberg, the United Nations created
other ad hoc tribunals to prosecute international war crimes and various crimes against
humanity.31 These tribunals have also faced challenges to judicial impartiality.32
Defendants at the ICTY and ICTR Tribunals have charged that Judges or Prosecutors
lacked impartiality. None of the ad hoc tribunals have faced a situation where the
Prosecutor challenged judicial impartiality nor have any of the ad hoc tribunals ruled on a
case where a judicial staff member’s activities served as a basis to attack judicial
impartiality.33
Questions regarding impartiality and independence are not limited to the
International Criminal Court and judges in general. In recent weeks allegations that
political influence improperly entered into discussions between President George W.
Bush and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales regarding whether to replace eight United
States Attorneys have rocked the United States.34 Indeed, commentators argue over

30

See Whitney Harris, supra note 15, at 500-501 (refuting critics charges and the political realities after
World War II that constrained full judicial impartiality).

31

For example the United Nations created the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”) in the wake of ethnic cleansing and the UN created the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (“ICTR”) to prosecute perpetrators of Hutu/Tutsi conflict.
32

See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision of the Bureau on Motion to Disqualify Judges
Pursuant to Rule 15 or in the Alternative That Certain Judges Recuse Themselves, ¶ 2 (Oct. 25, 1999)
(Challenging an ICTY judicial panel’s impartiality because it participated in a plenary finding Judge Odio
Benito’s election as Vice-President of Costa Rica compatible with her duties as an ICTY Judge)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 7]; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 90 (Jun. 1, 2001) (Claiming that biased prosecution diminished the trial chamber’s
impartiality) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 5]; Prosecutor v. Furundizija, Case No. IT-9517/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 164, (Challenging Judge Mumba’s impartiality given past history
when she represented her government on the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 9]

33

The writer searched all ad hoc tribunal cases challenging judicial impartiality and the writer found no
evidence of a judicial impartiality challenge on the aforementioned basis.

34

See David C. Iglesias, Op-Ed, Why I Was Fired. N.Y. Times, March 21, 2007, at A21 (In his editorial
piece former US Attorney David Iglesis contends that despite, excellent performance reviews, the

- 14 -

whether the President or Attorney General could have dismissed the US Attorneys for
political reasons since they serve “at the pleasure of the President.”35 Issues like these
reflect on the independence of the Judiciary and Prosecutorial discretion. Previously the
Bush administration faced a similar challenge regarding its motives when the
administration nominated former White House Counsel Harriet Miers to replace Sandra
Day O’Connor on the United States Supreme Court. Among the various reasons why
President Bush withdrew Miers’ nomination were questions raised in the U.S. Senate
about her role as White House Counsel and position in setting controversial
administration policies.36
The United States Supreme Court has not escaped criticism either. Indeed, many
point to Justice Antonin Scalia’s duck hunting trip with Vice-President Dick Cheney as
especially troubling, given that the Vice-President was a party in an upcoming court
case.37 To many observers, what was especially troubling about this was Justice Scalia’s
refusal to recuse himself when his objective appearance of impartiality was compromised
by his enjoying a hunting trip with a known future litigant in his court.38 Equally

American Attorney General, Alberto Gonzalez, suggested that the President fire him when he would not
rush a corruption investigation against a democratic politician.) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
tab 35].
35

See Evan Perez, Divisions Hinder Efforts At Justice Department --- Two Differing Camps Emerge As
Former Chief of Staff Is Set To Testify About Firings, Wall St. J., March 26, 2007, at A6 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 37].

36

See E. J. Dionne Jr., Editorial, Bush’s Dangerous Choice, Wash. Post, October 4, 2005, at A23
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 35]
37

See Justice and Junkets, N.Y. Times, January 27, 2006, at A22 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at tab 38].

38

Id.
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damaging was evidence that “gifts” and other junkets are not uncommon for Supreme
Court Justices to receive.39
This paper will not rehash political issues and will not revisit issues already
discussed in Prosecutor v. Kony, Prosecutor’s Application to Separate the Senior Legal
Advisor to the Pre-Trial Division from Rendering Legal Advice Regarding The Case,40
but instead this paper will look at the issue of impartiality between the Office of the
Prosecutor the other organs of the International Criminal Court. Particularly, this paper
will analyze what structural safeguards protect Judicial and Prosecutorial decision
making and what are the dangers of actual or apparent political influence on judicial
impartiality. This paper will concentrate on the emergence of independence standards in
international tribunals from Nuremberg, to the ad-hoc tribunals and finally the ideals
expressed by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Overall, this paper
will discuss judicial independence and prosecutorial discretion, their strengths and flaws
at the ICC, and the advantages and disadvantages of politics interfering with ICC
decisions.
III. JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS
Judicial independence is a paramount concern for judges in all judicial systems.41
Assessing Judicial independence in international criminal tribunal is more difficult
39

See Id. (“The Los Angeles Times reported in 2004, for example, that Justice Clarence Thomas had
accepted thousands of dollars in gifts in recent years, including an $800 leather jacket, a $1,200 set of tires
from Nascar and an extravagant vacation from a conservative activist. Federal judges below the Supreme
Court level accept dozens of free vacations each year from well-heeled special interests under the guise of
''judicial education.''”).
40

Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 14 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 10].

41

Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment, Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal
Tribunals, 99 A.J.I.L. 359 (April 2005). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 26].
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because none of the tribunals reflect a single legal system, unlike many national courts
where “judges, lawyers, and commentators” can base their interpretations on the tradtions
of a single system.42 Independence increases public respect in the courts and makes the
public and governments more likely to turn to courts to resolve disputes.43 Furthermore
independence helps judges keep an eye toward the law and filter out extraneous concerns
that should not weigh on their judgments.44 Overall the concerns for judicial
independence help to increase predictability and enhance trust in judicial decisions.45
Measuring impartiality is based on assessing a judges subjective and objective
impartiality.46 A judge’s prior and outside activities help to determine whether he or she
can rule impartially in a particular case.47 The relatively confined world of international
legal tribunal actors (judges, attorneys and prosecutors) complicates the issue since actors
in this small group may have previously participated in conflicting roles.48 Furthermore,

42

Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trial: Difficulties and Prospects, 27 Yale J.
Int’l L. 111, 116 (Winter 2002) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 22].

43

Meron, supra note 41, at 359 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 27].

44

Id. Extraneous concerns can include issues of tenure, pay, political pressure or any other sets of factors
that most court systems seek to eliminate from judicial decisions.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

See Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the
International Judge, 44 Harv. Int’l L. J. 271, 280, (Winter 2003) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at tab 26].

48

Id. (“[A] judge on an international court may have acted in the past as counsel before the same tribunal,
or may have acted as an advisor to one of the parties before the tribunal; she may have served as a diplomat
dealing with issues which subsequently cone before the court; or she may have expressed views in
academic writings on issues directly relevant to the case.”)
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rules in many legal systems favors academics or other skilled persons to fill key
positions.49

A. Objective and subjective appearance of impartiality among
international war crimes tribunals
Judicial independence is the mechanism that ensures the goal of judicial
impartiality.50 An independent judiciary ensures that judges apply the law, free of selfinterest constraints, or other issues that can improperly cloud their judgment.51

Judicial

independence must balance the need for decisional independence with accountability.52
Thus judicial independence helps judges block out extraneous influences and apply the
law neutrally.53 It is the means we use to protect the right to a fair trial of the accused.54
In the United States, the American Constitution grants all “judicial power” to the federal
judiciary, while giving Congress the power to hold the judiciary accountable.55 In the
area of International Human Rights law judicial independence is the means we use to
protect the end – judicial impartiality.56

49

Id.

50

Charles Gardner Geyh, When Courts & Congress Collide: The Struggles for Control of America’s
Judicial System 8 (2006) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 13].

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed 60, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) (U.S. Supreme Court held that
Congress had no right to change the court’s original jurisdiction) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at tab 4].
56

William A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and
Sierra Leone 505 (2006) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 19].
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While subjectively a judge or prosecutor may be above reproach, structural
deficiencies in nomination, tenure and appointment, affecting judicial independence, can
objectively cast doubt on the officer’s ability to impartially complete his or her job.57
International bodies address the problems created by the lack of objective or subjective
judicial independence differently.
While traditional independence analysis looks at the protection governments give
to judges’ decisional independence to protect the end of impartiality, it is clear that the
protections extend to all aspects of the judicial process. At the heart of the Prosecutor’s
Application in Prosecutor v. Kony, is whether the Pre-Trial Chamber based its decision
on legitimate gap filling or whether the decision reflects improper judicial activism. Gap
filling is a proper judicial exercise because drafters often leave provisions open to
interpretation at the discretion of the court.58 Indeed the ICC Preparatory Commission
specifically left provisions open for the Court’s future interpretation.59
Articles 40 and 41 note that judges must be independent and impartial, but the
articles only discuss how outside activities may affect independence and objective bias
may affect impartiality.60 Here, we face a question where the Pre-Trial Chamber Judges’

57

Id. at 506.

58

Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal Court: An Institutional Guide to
Analyzing International Adjudication. 44 Colum. J. Transnat’l L., 377, 386 (2006) (“Gap-filling occurs
when other institutions fail to articulate a specific rule so that judges must make a policy determination in
the process of resolving the dispute at hand. The negotiating history behind the Rome Statute illustrates the
gap-filling role judges must often fill; some delegates to the ICC’s Preparatory Commission argued that
problems arising from ambiguity in the treaty would be naturally addressed by the bench.”) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 33].

59

Id. See Also Id. at note 39 (“See, e.g., William K. Lietzau, Check and Balances and Elements of Proof:
Structural Pillars for the International Criminal Court, 32 Cornell Int’l L.J. 477, 481 (1999) (discussing
ambiguity in regard to the elements of crimes)”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 25].
60

Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 40-41 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1].
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impartiality may raise reasonable concerns of bias. Furthermore, since this case is unique
and the drafters failed to further delineate the boundaries of objective bias, then the Trial
Chamber must “gap-fill” by looking to decisions and rules in other jurisdictions to
determine the test for impartiality. Before we gap fill from other ad hoc tribunals we
should first see if there are relevant ICC provisions that further define a judge’s
impartiality obligations.
i. Rome Statute Articles that provide structural safeguards to
attacks to judicial independence
The Rome Statute of the ICC provides structural safeguards and guards against
attacks to judicial independence. Article 36 of the Rome Statute details the qualifications
judicial candidates must possess and their election procedures.61 Specifically, judges
must be “persons of high moral character” and judicial candidates must have international
humanitarian law experience in addition to being eligible to serve on their home nation’s
highest court.62 Furthermore, Articles 46 – 49 outline detailed procedures for when State
Parties may remove judges for misconduct and those articles also detail judicial
privileges, immunities and protections for their salaries from political attack.63
On its surface the Rome Statute provides many safeguards for the independence
of ICC Judges and the Office of the Prosecutor. Article 36 § 3 notes that the state parties
must choose among judicial candidates that reflect “high moral character, impartiality

61

Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 36 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1]

62

Id.

63

Id. at art. 46-49; See Also Charles Gardner Geyh, supra note 47, at 30 (“The debate on the modification
[of the compensation clause] underscored the tension between two competing aims: to insulate judicial
salary from legislative manipulation and to permit the legislature to increase judicial pay to ensure that
judge receive salaries commensurate with their status as members of an independent branch of
government.” Clarification added) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 13];
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and integrity” and who are eligible for the highest judicial offices in their home
countries.64 The statute provides for judicial elections by secret ballot and legal,
geographic and gender diversity.65 Once Judges have been elected by two-thirds of the
State Parties, then the judges serve for nine years without eligibility for reelection.66
While these factors help favor independence, the relevant Article regarding
independence does not define the limits of Judicial Independence. Article 40 notes that
“The judges shall be independent in the performance of their functions,” but it doesn’t
say what “independent” or “independence” contains.67 The other provisions in Article 40
attempt to place broad limits on outside influence by noting that Judges shall serve full
time and not engage in activities that may or appear to compromise their independence.68
Furthermore, only an “absolute majority” of the Judges may decide what outside
activities compromise their judgment or affect their fulltime commitment to the court.69
Many critics contend that the limited authority and political control of judges and
prosecutors creates a far effective prosecution of alleged rights violators.70 These critics

64

Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 36 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1].

65

Id. at art 36 §§ 6-7.

66

Id. at art. 36 § 9 (The statute create staggered elections so that a third of the judges are eligible for
reelection every three years. The first panel consisted of judges with three, six, and nine year terms, but the
three year term judges could be reelected.)
67

Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 40 § 1. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1]

68

Id. at §§ 2-3.

69

Id. at § 4.

70

See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 1,
(January, 2005). (Posner and Yoo contend that states comply with international court decisions more often
when the judges have very limited jurisdiction and are under political control. Indeed Posner and Yoo
contend that the most “independent” international dispute resolution bodies are the least effective and are
the ones most likely to have their judgments ignored by state parties. Posner and Yoo however do make an
exception for the European Court of Humans Rights and other European bodies where they note the
political harmony and independent legal traditions for the success of those independent bodies).
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contend that those who favor international courts incorrectly believe that the judicial
independence favored in domestic courts can be reproduced on the international level
with similar results.71 However these critics note that international tribunals lack “a
hierarchy, an enforcement mechanism, and a legislative instrument that allows for
centralized change.”72 In many situations a party who loses before an independent
tribunal will ignore the order because the court has no enforcement mechanism.73
These same critics reserve some of their most bitter complaints for the
International Court of Justice. Posner and Yoo cite many of the features that support
independence as what they see as flaws in the ICJ.74 Indeed Posner and Yoo argue that
nations only comply with ICJ decisions only 40% of the time when the court exercises its
compulsory jurisdiction.75
ii. ICTY’s Application of the objective impartiality standard
based on a Judge’s previous service for her home government
In Prosecutor v. Furundzija76 the ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected the
defendant’s challenge to the Trial Chamber’s independence and objective impartiality.77

[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 30]. See Also Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Why states Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 Calif. L. Rev.
899, (May, 2005). (Helfer and Slaughter argue that Posner and Yoo’s conclusions are based on flaw
methodology and discount the success of independent tribunals). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at tab 24].
71

Posner, supra at 12. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 30].

72

Id. at 13.

73

Id.

74

See Posner, supra at 35. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 30].

75

Id. at 37.

76

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, Jul. 21, 2000.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 10]

77

Id. at ¶ 164.
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In this case the defendant complained that the Presiding Judge Mumba’s previous
activities with the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (“UNCSW”)
gave the appearance of bias.78 The defendant did not allege that Judge Mumba was
actually or subjectively biased, but only that a reasonable person might doubt the
impartiality of her decision, given her past activities advocating for UNCSW.79
Previously Judge Mumba had represented the Zambian Government on the
UNCSW, and while she represented the government the UNCSW, she expressed concern
over “allegations of mass and systematic rape” and “urged the International Tribunal to
give them priority by prosecuting those allegedly responsible.” 80 Judge Mumba’s
previous activities were relevant because the ICTY court convicted Furundzija for rape as
a war crime.81
A Judge’s personal convictions alone may not serve as a basis for disqualification
on grounds that the Judge is objectively biased. Indeed, the Court noted that “[a]bsolute
neutrality on the part of a judicial officer can hardly if ever be achieved.”82 In rejecting
Furundzija’s arguments the ICTY Appeals Chamber noted that many of Judge Mumba’s
previous activities and indeed, many of the UNCSW’s goals against rape and for the

78

Id.

79

Id. at ¶ 169.

80

Id. at ¶ 166.

81

Id. at ¶ 13.

82

Id. at ¶ 203.
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rights of women are advocated by the United Nations Charter and Security Council
Resolutions.83
To measure when outside influence may improperly weigh or seem to weigh on
judicial decisions the court noted that international tribunals have a two-part test; one
aspect looks at subjective independence and impartiality and the other approach measure
objective impartiality and independence.84 The ICY Appeals Chamber noted that “a
Judge “might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind” to a case if there is proof of
actual bias or of an appearance of bias.””85 Because of the small nature of the legal
community there is often a relationship between a judicial or prosecutorial candidate’s
necessary experience and his or her past, sometimes conflicting, professional
endeavors.86 Regardless of these issues, judges are presumed to be impartial unless the
defendant can advance evidence otherwise.87

83

Id. at ¶ 201.

84

Id. at ¶ 179. See also Id. at ¶ 181 quoting the European Court of Human Rights in Piersack v. Belgium
(“Whilst impartiality normally denotes absence of prejudice or bias, its existence or otherwise can, notably
under Article 6 § 1 (art.6-1) of the Convention, be tested in various way. A distinction can be drawn in this
context between a subjective approach, that is endeavoring to ascertain the personal conviction of a given
Judge in a given can, and an objective approach, that is determining whether he offered guarantees
sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.”); See Also Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 3, at
¶ 2 (“Under the objective component of this test, the court must assess relevant circumstances that may
give rise to an “appearance” of partiality. If there is “legitimate reason to fear” a lack of impartiality in a
judge, her or she must withdraw from the case”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 6].
85

Furundzija, supra note 61, at ¶ 179 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 9]

86

See Furundzija, supra note 61, at ¶ 205 (“The Appeals Chamber does not consider that a Judge should be
disqualified because of qualifications he or she possesses which, by their very nature, play an integral role
in satisfying the eligibility requirements. Judge Mumba’s membership of the UNCSW and, in general, her
previous experience in this area would be relevant to the requirement under Article 13(1) of the Statute for
experience in international law, including human right law. The possession of this experience is a statutory
requirement for Judges to be elected to this Tribunal. It would be an odd result if the operation of an
eligibility requirement were to lead to an inference of bias.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
tab 9].
87

Id. at. ¶ 182, 197.
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iii. Bitti’s effect on the Pre-Trial Chamber’s objective impartiality
compared to Judge Mumba in Prosecutor v. Furundzija
In the instant case we must decide whether Mr. Bitti’s work as Senior Legal
Advisor to the Pre-Trial Chamber weighs on the Judges’ impartiality and independence.
As previously noted, the OTP has already posited that law clerks and advisors affect the
impartiality and independence of judges so that what the judge may not do, neither
should those who advise him or her.88 The OTP’s reasoning is based almost exclusively
on a jurisdictional analysis noting that “Jurisdictions applying the objective appearance of
impartiality test have universally disapproved of judges sitting as arbiters of cases to
which they were exposed in some other capacity, including in particular the capacity of
prosecutor or investigator.”89
At the outset it is important to note that, as in Furundzija, there is no allegation
that any of the judges sitting in the Pre-Trial Chamber are actually biased; but there are
concerns that having Mr. Bitti serve as a judicial advisor immediately after serving as an
advisor in the Office of the Prosecutor may give the “objective appearance” of bias.90
This paper looks at the factors other international criminal tribunals have used to
substantiate or reject claims of bias and whether Mr. Bitti’s conduct involves enough of
these factors to deminish the Judges’ impartiality and independence. Furundzija noted
that seemingly incompatible prior activities, without more, will not automatically destroy
a judge’s impartiality and independence, especially given the factors that favor

88

Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 14, at ¶ 40-41. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 10]

89

Id. at ¶ 46.

90

Id. at ¶ 27 (“Further, the circumstance presented by the Senior Legal Adviser’s successive appointments
is just one of many possible situations in which as circumstance relating to a legal adviser of a judge could
potentially undermine the appearance of impartiality of the judge or the tribunal”)
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experience in international tribunals coupled with the close-knit international legal
community.91 Indeed, the court noted that when measuring independence or bias one
must look from the perspective of a reasonable person.92 Furundizija held that a
“reasonable person must be an informed person, with knowledge of all the relevant
circumstance, including the traditions of integrity and impartiality that form a part of the
background…”93
While it is true that the close-knit legal community of the international tribunals
seems to favor the view that a more stringent application of the objective independence
standard would impinge on court operations, other factors unique to Mr. Bitti’s situation
weigh against adopting a lax approach to the appearance of bias. In Furundzija, Judge
Mumba, represented her government, not herself on the UNCSW, but authors of the
amicus curiae brief and one of the Furundzija prosecutors attended a 1998 meeting of the
UNCSW while Judge Mumba was still a member.94 Indeed, Judge Mumba advocated
increasing rape prosecutions for the former Yugoslavia before she became an ICTY
Judge.95
Despite by Judge Mumba’s and Mr. Bitti’s seemingly contradictory former legal
jobs, unlike Furundzija, the Office of the Prosecutor in the instant case has raised the

91

Furundzija, supra at ¶ 205. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 9]

92

Id. at ¶ 190.

93

Id.

94

Id. at ¶ 166.

95

Id.
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issue early as the Court suggested in Furundzija.96 Thus, by raising the issue early the
OTP hasn’t “waived” its rights and indeed, once the OTP discovered Mr. Bitti’s
conflicting roles it immediately notified the Pre-Trial Chamber.97
B. In rare circumstances, given the totality of facts, administrative
decisions can reflect more than simple court administration, but could
implicate judicial decision-making and thus make usually immune
administrative decisions by judges subject to the subjective and
objective impartiality tests.
Even if the a judicial officer passes the objective and subjective independence
tests, he or she may still be disqualified if his or her outside activities constrain his or her
ability to carry out assigned duties.98 In ICTY case Prosecutor v. Delalic99 defendants
sought to disqualify the entire panel of Trial Chamber judges because those judges had
previously participated in an administrative matter.100 Defendants Zejnil Delalic,
Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic, and Esad Landzo filed a motion under Rule 15 of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence because the judges participated in a plenary session
where the judges found that the nomination of Judge Odio Benito as Vice-President of
Costa Rica did not destroy her impartiality.101 The defendants contended that the

96

Id. at ¶ 173 (“First, the Appellant states that he first discovered judge Mumba’s associations and personal
interest in the case after judgement was rendered, and for this reason, only then raised the matter before the
Bureau. Although the Appeals Chamber has decided to consider this matter further, given its general
importance, it would point out that information was available to the Appellant at trial level, which should
have enabled him to discover Judge Mumba’s past activites and involvement with the UNCSW”); See Also
Id. at ¶ 174 (“The Appeals Chamber considers that it would not be unduly burdensome for the Appellant to
find out the qualifications of the Presiding Judge of his trial”).

97

Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 14, at ¶ 15-16. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 10]

98

Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 3, at ¶ 10. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 6].

99

Id.

100

Id. at ¶ 2.

101

Id.
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resolution of an administrative matter, whether Judge Benito could impartially serve,
prejudiced the judges against them.102 At the time Judge Benito served in the Appeals
Chamber and participated in the Celebici case.103
The Delalic Court distinguished between administrative adjudication of judicial
disqualification and exercise of judicial decision making.104 Indeed, the Court noted that
the ICTY statute required resolution of a matter questioning a judge’s independence at an
administrative level.105 Furthermore, the decision by the judges did not involve the
particular issues to be decided on appeal.106 To prevail, the defendant must have “shown
that the activity incompatible with the discharge of judicial functions has a direct and
specific impact upon the impartiality of a Judge in a particular case before a Chamber,
then the matter comes within the purview of the disqualification procedure.”107
Applying the Court’s standard in the instant case, even if Mr. Bitti satisfied the
objective and subjective impartiality requirements mentioned above, then his employer
judges could still be disqualified if their previous actions in selecting Mr. Bitti impinge
their impartiality. It is important to note that selecting Mr. Bitti as a legal advisor would
be a judicial function similar to the issue decided in Delalic because it does not invoke a
judge’s decision-making, but only his or her duties to select staff. Analogous to Delalic,

102

Id. at ¶ 11.

103

Id.

104

Id. at ¶ 15.

105

Id. at ¶ 14. The court noted that it decided a general question regarding the applicability of Article 13 of
the ICTY Statute to determine whether Judge Benito could continue her duties. It did not rule on the facts
particular to the case.
106

Id.

107

Id. at ¶ 10.
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its only when selecting his or her staff improperly links to a judge’s decision-making may
a party reasonably question a judge’s administrative activities.
In both Delalic and the Bitti case the relevant judges’ administrative decisions
were judicial decisions involving similar issues. In Delalic the judges were required to
administratively determine whether Judge Benito’s election to the Costa Rican VicePresidency constituted an activity that impinged her ability to carry out her duties in
general.108 Furthermore, the same judges had to later determine whether Judge Benito’s
duties as Vice-President of Costa Rica destroyed her objective impartiality to the Delalic
defendants, in that particular case.109
Unlike Mr. Bitti, Judge Benito never performed any function as Vice-President of
Costa Rica while she sat as an ICTY Judge and she first gave assurances to her
colleagues and the President of Costa Rica that she wouldn’t assume any executive roles
while on the bench.110 Thus, the Delalic court did not have to resolve an actual conflict
between administrative and Judicial duties, but only the appearance of a conflict.111

108

Id. at ¶ 12.

109

Id.

110

Id. Judge Benito duties as a judge were twice questioned by officers of the court when she was first
made a Cost Rican Vice-President and then when she was promoted to Second-Vice President. On both
occasions Judge Benito assured the court that she would take these titles in name only and would not
perform any duties of office while she sat on the Court. See also, Prosecutor v. Delalic, Decision of the
Bureau, 4 September 1998 at § 2 [reproduce in accompanying notebook at tab 5].
111

The ICTY Court does not have a provision similar to article 40 of the Rome Statute which prohibits
outside activities that may affect judicial or prosecutorial function. Since outside activities under Article 40
of the Rome Statute are not clearly delineated perhaps the court could have adopted an actual conflict
standard in Delalic if ICTY had a similar provision as the Rome Statute’s article 40 because an appearance
standard could lead to a flood of spurious motions to disqualify based on an appearance standard. Indeed,
if Article 40 of the Rome Statute delineated outside activities in the small community of international legal
participants it could pose many problems since many of the commentators, academics and court officers are
more closely linked than in many legal systems, as demonstrated by the Court’s reluctance to disqualify
Judge Mumba in Furundzija because of her previous activites.
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Also unlike Judge Benito, Mr. Bitti’s activities pose an actual conflict between a
Judge’s administrative duties and judicial decision-making.112 While Mr. Bitti will not
directly rule on issues his position provides guidance to the judges who will. When
selecting Mr. Bitti as a legal advisor, the judges must have known that Mr. Bitti had
previously served in the OTP. If the judges knew that Mr. Bitti worked on issues for the
OTP and sought his advice on the same issues as Senior Advisor to the Pre-Trial,
Chamber then it is likely that their administrative decision (selecting Mr. Bitti as Senior
Legal Advisor) would ultimately affect the Chamber’s judicial decisions (ruling on the
case).
While Mr. Bitti and the Judges may not be actually biased, the appearance of
using a seemingly biased legal advisor cannot stand. The Judges should either separate
Mr. Bitti so that he doesn’t advise the Court on the same issues that he worked on in the
OTP, or the Judges in the Pre-Trial Chamber, for whom he works, should recuse
themselves from the cases on which he worked while in the Office of the Prosecutor.
While the international legal community may be close knit, both Delalic and Furundzija
indicate that even within these close relationships, enough boundaries and safeguards
exist to protected judicial independence and shield against the appearance of bias.
C. Application of the objective appearance of bias standard to all judicial
staff and officer

112

Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision of the Bureau on Motion on Judicial Independence,
(Sept. 4, 1998) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 6] (While emphasizing the applicability of
the objective impartiality test the court noted “Judge Odio Benito has been holding the position of VicePresident in name only from the date she took the oath of office. She has committed herself not to take up
the duties of her post until she has completed her judicial duties. The contention that in the event of the
President’s absence she may have to assume his role is not one of substance. Under the Constitution of the
Republic of Costa Rica there are two other officials who can also undertake such a role – the first VicePresident and the President of the Legislative Assembly… Furthermore, the President of Costa Rica has
agreed that she will not assume her duties as Second Vice-President until such time”).
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In Prosecutor v. Akayesu113 the ICTR rejected defendant’s claims that political
pressures destroyed the trial chambers independence and impartiality.114 Akayesu
contended that remarks made by judges in “public and in private” coupled with “pressure
and special arrangements” tended to show partiality against the defendant.115 The court
noted that the defendant has the burden of showing the court’s lack of impartiality or
independence by “adequate and reliable evidence”116 Akayesu couldn’t meet the court’s
test through his bald allegations of bias and selective prosecution.117
Most importantly the Akayesu court distinguished between judicial bias and
prosecutorial discretion by adopting the holding of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in
Celebici.118 Furthermore the court not simply cite to Celebici’s weak separation between
the Office of the Prosecutor and the Tribunal.119 Indeed the court held that Prosecutorial

113

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICRT-96-4, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, (Jun. 1, 2001)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 5].

114

Id.

115

Id. at ¶ 90.

116

Id. at ¶ 91. (The court also quoted Furundzija, Judgement on appeal, para. 196-197.)

117

Id. at ¶¶ 92-94. The court rejected Akayesu’s claims that the Tribunal proceeded to prosecute only
Hutu’s because of victor’s justice.
118

Id. at ¶ 94, quoting Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No.IT-96-21, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber 613,
(Feb. 20, 2001) (hereinafter “Celebici”) “In the present context, indeed, in many criminal justice systems,
the entity responsible for proesectutions has finite financial and human resources and cannot realistically be
expected to prosecute every offender which may fall within the strict terms of its jurisdiction. It must of
necessity make decisions as to the nature of the crimes and the offenders to be prosecuted. It is beyond
question that the Prosecutor has a broad discretion in relation to the initiation of investigations and in the
preparation in indictments.” [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 8]
119

See Celebici, judgment on appeal, para. 613. In Celebici the court discussed the relationship between
abuse of prosecutorial discretion without making the distinction that the Akayesu Tribunal made between
judicial and prosecutorial independence. Indeed, the Celebici Tribunal discussed evidence of
discriminatory effect by the relationship between the prosecutor’s conduct and his or her failure or success
in charging similarly situated defendants. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 9]
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misconduct in pursuing a discriminatory policy will not weigh on the independence or
impartiality of the Tribunal unless there is a casual link between the Prosecutor’s office
and the Tribunal.120 Indeed the Prosecutor in his August 31, 2006 Application noted that
civil and common law jurisdiction code prevent judges from hearing cases that the judge
may have been involved with.121 Furthermore, both civil and common law jurisdictions
prohibit clerks from working on issues for the court that the clerk may have previously
worked on in any capacity.122 The court could have ruled without further explaining the
distinctions between the Tribunal and the Prosecutor’s office first mentioned in
Celebici.123
Many nations prevent judges from engaging in extrajudicial activities because of
the appearance of bias and the likelihood that such activities may interfere with a judicial
officer’s primary duties.124 Nations are not alone in regulating court officers extrajudicial
activities since several international organizations require the same of officers in the
adjudicative processes.125 The ICC Specifically bans judges from engaging in
extrajudicial “activity which is likely to interfere with their judicial functions or to affect
120

Id. at ¶ 96.

121

Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 14, at ¶ 49 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 10].

122

Id. at ¶ 51.

123

Id. As noted earlier, the court could have rested before furthering the distinction between the Office of
the Prosecutor and the Tribunal because Akayesu only made “general assertions” of a discriminatory policy
and he failed to advance any “adequate and reliable evidence.”
124

Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the
International Judge, 44 Harv. Int’l L. J. 271, 282(Winter 2003). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
tab 26].
125

Id. See Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sand, supra note 123, note 285 at notes 50-55. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 26] See also Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1]; See Also International Criminal Court, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000), Rule
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confidence in their independence.”126 Indeed many international judicial bodies have
similar requirements.127
Given the previous discussion, it is likely that the test for whether a staff
member’s behavior will affect judicial impartiality is based on conduct not title. Thus
judicial staff members who have little or no role in advising a judge on cases will likely
not raise suspicions of partiality if that staff member were to “switch sides.” Likewise a
staff member that has advised a court litigant should probably not advise the judge on the
same matter. Since, these present question of fact based on individual cases, courts must
look to individual circumstances. This does not mean there cannot be a guidepost for
proper behavior such as possibly adopting clear conflict of interest rules for staff in the
ICC.
IV. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND INDEPENDENCE
Many participants at the Rome Conference that established the International
Criminal Court held conflicting views of the dutites of the Office of the Prosecutor.128
Several attendees questioned whether the role prosecutors would be analogous to that in
their home nations or to that in the other tribunals such as ICTY or the ICTR.129 An

126

Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 40 § 2. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1]. See Also
Mackenzie, supra at 282. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 26].

127

See Mackenzie, supra note 123 at 282. Mackenzie notes similar provisions in the empowering statutes
of the International Court of Justice, European Court of Human Rights, and the International Treaty of the
Law of the Seas. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 26].
128

Int’l Workshop, The Prosecutor of a Permanent International Criminal Court 136 (Louise Arbour, et al.,
ed. 2000) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 15]
129

Schabas, supra note at 512. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 20]
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independent Office of the Prosecutor emerged from the conference, but politics quickly
challenged the independent prosecutor.130
A. Past Prosecutorial Independence
As noted above, Nuremberg serves as the basis for international criminal
tribunals. Critics charged that Nuremberg prosecutors and judges were biased.131
Indeed, many cite the USSR’s representative’s statement that presumed guilt as proof of
Nuremberg’s bias.132 Despite the appearance of a lack of impartiality the Nuremberg
Tribunal successfully and fairly dispensed impartial justice.133 In the aftermath of World
War Two “absolute impartiality” was unachievable.134 Realistically the allied victors
appointed the Tribunal’s judges.135 But, there is no evidence that General Nikitchenko’s
prior statement influenced his judgment of the accused or the decisions of the Tribunal’s
other judges.136 Furthermore, even critics of the Tribunal’s impartiality realize that the

130

Id.

131

Whitney Harris, supra note 15, at 500-501 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 14]
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court convicted members of the Nazi regime based on ample evidence.137 The problems
faced by the Nuremberg Tribunal are different than those faced by the ICC. Nuremberg
serves as the benchmark for the international criminal tribunals, while the ICC serves as
modern interpretation of Nuremberg’s goal of justice over vengeance.138 Rationality
cautions us against repeating the mistakes of the past. Nuremberg formed quickly after
the Second World War’s devastating damage while decades passed before the nations
agreed to create an International Criminal Court. Furthermore, in those long decades
before nations formed the ICC, other international adjudicative bodies, such as the
European Court of Human Rights, ICTY and the ICTR formed.
B. Nuremberg constrasted with the ICC
Learning from the past and the experience of the other international courts, it is clear that
the ICC framers intended to create an independent prosecutor removed from political
restraints.139 An independent prosecutor is essential to the ICC’s operation because
otherwise political constraints may prevent the Security Council or a State Party from
referring a matter to the ICC.140 The Prosecutor, his deputies, nor his or her staff may not
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engage in activities that endanger their duties or give the appearance of impropriety.141
But like the independent judiciary, to protect fairness and impartiality the Office of the
Prosecutor is not unaccountable.142
At Nuremberg each of the four signatories to the London Agreement appointed a
Chief Prosecutor.143 The American Prosecutor answered directly to President Truman
and the British Chief Prosecutor was the UK’s Attorney General.144

The Prosecutors

received their resources from their appointing governments and acted in the name of their
home states.145 Together the Chief Prosecutors from each nation acted as a committee to
form a prosecutorial plan of action.146
Although appointed by their home government, Nuremberg prosecutors did not
have to consult with their national government to obtain evidence or apprehend the
accused.147 Indeed, the Prosecutors at Nuremburg and Tokyo did not have the same
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needs to cajole national governments that can hamper modern war crimes prosecutions.148
Unlike article 86 of the Rome Statue that requires states to cooperate, the Nuremberg and
Tokyo tribunals lacked this requirement because it would be unnecessary.149
Furthermore, the Allies relied on the fact that they could use their home governments’
vast resources and military, their total control of Germany and Japan, and there was no
need to request evidence or to apprehend accused war criminals.150
C. Structural Safeguards in the Rome Statute to ensure prosecutorial
independence
The Rome Statute provides various ways to refer and prevent prosecutions. The
independent Office of the Prosecutor is only one of several means to start or prevent a
prosecution.151 Article 16 permits the Security Council to defer any prosecution for up to
12 months under its Chapter VII powers of the UN Charter.152 The State Parties rejected
a draft version that gave the Security Council the power to prevent prosecutions for a
case “being dealt with by the Security Council as a threat to or breach of the peace or an
act of aggression under Chapter VII of the charter…”153 Arguably under the proposed
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version a single member of the Security Council could have prevented prosecutions
because it takes only one member’s vote to place an item on the Council’s agenda.154
Furthermore the five permanent members of the Security Council could prevent
removing the item from the agenda with their veto powers.155
Although the State Parties ultimately rejected the proposed version of Article 16
that gave the Security Council greater power to regulate and reject prosecutions, the State
Parties failed to take any actions that would have clearly limited the role of politics in
ICC prosecutions.156 While the Article 16 provision that permits Security Council
intervention is obviously a compromise, no one attending the Preparatory Committee or
the Rome Conference could have foreseen how rapidly a the United States would exploit
Article 16.157 As noted earlier the parties foresaw American disagreement with the treaty
and the parties sought ways to placate the United States desires.158
D. The United States exploitation of Article 16 to diminish the
independence of the Office of the Prosecutor and make sure that all
investigations were under its political control
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Since 2000 the United States has not hidden its disdain for the ICC.159 Former
American President Bill Clinton wrangled with the subject, literally waiting until the last
possible moment to sign the treaty on December 31, 2000.160 Once President George W.
Bush assumed office, the United States “unsigned” the Rome treaty.161 Furthermore the
United States took more aggressive actions to ensure that US nationals in states that
ratified the Rome Statute or may be subject to its provisions would never be prosecuted
by the court.162 Indeed, the United States began to exploit Article 98(2) of the statute that
pre-empts the court’s jurisdiction if it would require a nation to breach an agreement with
another state.163 It signed agreements that would protect US national in foreign nations
per Article 98(2) requirements.164
US actions to protect its nationals culminated with the American Service
Members’ Protection Act.165 The law, jokingly referred to as “The Hague Invasion Act”
signed by President Bush in August 2002 authorizes the President to use force to recover
a US national held by the court.166 While these actions may seem as mere annoyances
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and points of disagreement with the United States we have yet to see if these actions will
impinge the court’s operation or its officers.
Even before the Court began operations the United States used political influence
to goad the Security Council to comply with its demands.167 In June 2002 the United
States threatened to use it Security Council veto powers over all future UN peacekeeping
missions if the Security Council didn’t invoke Article 16 to shield all UN authorized
missions.168 The Security Council, without opposition, invoked Article 16 in Resolution
1442 to shield current and former personnel on peacekeeping missions.169
The Resolution immediately sparked controversy and helped to draw attention to
an ambiguity in the Rome Statute.170 The Security Councils invoked Article 16, which
allows the Security Council to act “only when there is a threat to the peace, a breach of
the peace or an act of aggression.”171 Professor Schabas notes that it’s unclear whether
any court could review actions of the Security Council by possibly analyzing if by
invoking Article 16 under its Chapter VII powers, the Security Council faced the
requisite threat to peace or aggression.172 The ICJ failed to address this issue because it
considers itself equal with the Security Council, thus there is no hierarchy body that
could review the decisions of the other.173
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Schabas contends that while the ICJ may not review Security Council decisions
the ICC or ad hoc tribunals could review 174 Indeed he cites ICTY’s review of Security
Council resolution 827 in Prosecutor v. Tadic to support review of Security Council
actions.175 Schabas fails to develop his ideas any further by noting the Prosecutor will
unlikely prosecute peacekeepers and even if the ICC Prosecutor wanted to charge
peacekeepers, most of the time the issue is handled by the peacekeepers home nation.176
Schabas theory about the scope of Article 16 opens a floodgate of possible
outcome; all touch on the sensitive issue of Judicial and Prosecutorial Independence.
Will the ICC have the power of Judicial Review, thus enabling it to rule on the validity of
Security Council resolutions when the Council invokes Article 16 allegedly under their
Chapter VII powers? Presumably, the ICC could rule on whether the political concerns
shaped Security Council decisions to the detriment of the accused. If the ICC rules that a
Security Council is invalid, then what actions could the Prosecutor take? Lastly, what is
the likely outcome of a power struggle between the ICC and the Security Council?
It seems likely that given these questions then there will be a showdown between
advocated of Prosecutorial independence and those concerned about maintaining some
degree of control. These fears are grounded on the notion that a prosecutor that is too
insulted from political concerns may go on a witch-hunt based on spurious charges.177
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Since the end of the Cold War states have increasing used international tribunals
to resolve disputes.178 According to some observers international courts heard more than
80% of the cases between the end of WWII and 2002 within the last 15 year.179 These
bodies have become increasingly independent and have built upon the lessons learned at
Nuremburg.180 Not only have various international tribunals become more independent,
but so too have their constituent parts. In the wake that emerged at the end of the Cold
War the United Nations created two tribunals; one for the Former Yugolslavia (ICTY)
and one for Rwanda (ICTR). Both of these tribunals departed remarkable from those
created at Nuremburg and Tokyo.181 Both ICTY and ICTR created independent
prosecutors in contrast to Nuremberg and Tokyo.182 Both ICTY and ICTR create an
independent prosecutor’s organ.183
Checks and balances ensure that the Prosecutor remains within the bounds of his
power and those measures ensure that he or she does not initiate frivolous
prosecutions.184
It’s unlikely that US efforts to protect its nationals from prosecution will
fundamentally damage court operations.185 The United States has only succeeded in
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getting nations with little political power to sign agreements to protect US citizens from
the treaty operations.186 More importantly several European nations, Canada, Mexico
have refused to sign agreements with the United States because they feel that US actions
indirectly attack the Court.187 Furthermore these nations have the most US expatriates
and wield significant political and economic power.188
If independence means that we should gird against the appearance of impropriety
by preventing improper political influence to the detriment of the accused, it also means
that we should take steps to ensure that the prosecutor is not abusing his or her power or
failing to act.189 To guard against prosecutorial abuses the statute must first defer to the
State parties and may only act when those state parties fail.190 The Statute also requires
the prosecutor to only initiate investigations if he or she has a “reasonable basis” to
believe that the accused has committed a crime.191 Furthermore the Prosecutor must seek

185

See Also Id. at 23 (Schabas notes that current actions by the United States have done little damage to the
court).
186

See Id. at note 70 (“As of 1 April 2003, agreements had been made with Afghanistan, the Dominican
Republic, the Gambia, Honduras, India, Israel, Kuwait, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia,
Nepal, Palau, Romania, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Timor Leste and Uzbekistan.) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 19].
187

Id. at 22.

188

Id.

189

See Roy S. Lee, Creating an International Criminal Court – of Procedures and Compromises, in
Reflections on the International Criminal Court 150, (Herman A.M. von Hebel, et al. ed., T.M.C, Asser
Press 1999). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 17].

190

Id.; See Also Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 17 (noting that a state may challenge the court’s
jurisdiction if it has already prosecuted the alleged offense.) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab
1].
191

Id. at art. 53 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1].

- 43 -

permission from the Pre-Trial chamber to “proceed with an investigation”192 The ICC
statute also contains structural safeguards to ensure that a prosecutor’s decision not to
prosecute an alleged violation is based on reason and experience.193
Understanding the respective roles of the judges of the trial chamber and the role
of the prosecutor and his or her officers is key to assessing if the Prosecutor has standing
to raise the appearance of bias.
V. CONCLUSION
At the least the Pre-Trial Chamber should ensure that Mr. Bitti does not work on
cases that he previously worked on for the Office of the Prosecutor and ensure that Bitti
does not influence the work or the Pre-Trial Chamber in the same case. If there has been
an actual exchange of information that the Judges feel make the actually biased against
the defendant then, of course, those judges must recuse themselves. The ICC should
supplement its staff rules to ensure that conflict on interest do not occur in the future.
When deciding if a staff member affects a judge’s impartiality we must take look at that
staff member’s duties and advices that he or she may give to the judge. Furthermore,
Prosecutors should look to the Judiciary for guidance to its long-held traditions of
independence and impartiality, but it must also remember that especially in international
war crimes tribunals some degree of political interference may enter the field. While the
drafters intended for the Office of the Prosecutor to remain as independent as possible,
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Article 16 opens Pandora’s box to possible politicalization of international war crimes
investigations.
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